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Socialist Legal Theory 
in the Post-Pashukanis Era 
by Rett R. Ludwikowski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The western student of socialist legal theory who wants to learn something 
about Soviet jurisprudence of the post-Stalinist era will experience great diffi-
culty. The student can find that Marx, Engels, and Lenin's theory of law has 
been studied repeatedly in the West, and the principal thesis of the "fathers of 
scientific communism" relating to the withering away of the state and law in the 
Communist society has been analyzed in a number of books and articles. l The 
student will also discover good translations of works by Pashukanis and Vyshin-
sky, leading jurists during Lenin's and Stalin's times, and numerous comments 
on their theories. 2 The student will face real difficulties, however, if he wishes 
to learn something about jurisprudence in the Soviet bloc today.3 Western 
students of legal theory know Bratus, Gienkin, Kechakjan, Strogovitch, Denisov, 
Pigolkin, Opalek, Wroblewski, and dozens of other current socialist experts on 
jurisprudence only as names. 4 An historical approach is typical of even the most 
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. 
I See M. CAIN & A. HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979); H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1982) 
[hereinafter COLLINS]; H. KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (1955) [hereinafter KELSEN). 
, It is enough to mention only a few of them. See E. PASHUKANIS, LAW & MARXISM: A GENERAL 
THEORY (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds. 1978) [hereinafter LAW & MARXISM]; P. BEIRNE & R. SHARLET, 
PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW (1980) [hereinafter BEIRNE & SHARLET]; 
MARXISM AND LAW 307-27 (P. Beirne & R. Quinney eds. 1982). See also A. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF 
THE SOVIET STATE (1948) [hereinafter VYSHINSKY]; and Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the 
Development of Marxian Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157-66 (1949) [hereinafter Pashukanis and 
Vyshinsky]. Although all of these works exist, there are still some western theorists who complain that 
Pashukanis' "views received far less attention and study than they deserve." See Erh-Soon Tay & 
Kamenka, The Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist. 19 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 77 (1970) [hereinafter 
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM]. 
3 A short examination of the current trends can be found in O. JOFFE & P. MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1983). 
4 Bratus is relatively better known in the West for his attacks on Pashukanis in the 1930s. See generally 
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, supra note 2. Bratus is the author of a few books dealing with the problems 
of the Soviet theory of law. S. BRATUS, OBSHCHAJA TEORIA SOVETSKOVO PRAVA (GENERAL THEORY OF 
SOVIET LAW) (1966); S. BRATUS, GRAZDANSKOE PRAVO. POSOBIJE DLA SLUSHATELI NARODNYCH UNIV-
ERSITETOV (THE CITIZENS LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES) 
(1967); S. BRATUS, SUBJEKTY GRAZHDANSKOVO PRAVA (CORPORATE BODIES IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW) (1950). 
See also D. GENKIN, SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO (SOVIET CITIZENS' LAW) (2d ed. 1967); D. 
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recent publications, where the few reflections on current problems of Soviet 
legal theory are usually preceded by a lengthy analysis of the Pashukanis era.5 
If, on further inquiry, the western student should try to approach the socialist 
lawyer, accidently abroad in the West, he is likely to face additional problems. 
He will realize that his interlocutor from the socialist country is not eager to 
discuss the problems of socialist jurisprudence. It will strike the western theorist 
that his expertise ends where the other's begins. 
At first, it seems paradoxical; the Western student of the socialist theory of 
law will consider his socialist colleague not as well read in the classical books of 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin as one might expect from his socialist background. 
Everyday contact with Marxism has a very peculiar impact on the mentality of 
the socialist lawyer. On the one hand, he is well trained in how to decorate his 
speeches and works with phrases taken from the "sacred books" on classical 
Marxism; on the other hand, he does not take Marxist rhetoric very seriously. 
It is paradoxical that the socialist lawyer usually has a better understanding of 
the window-dressing character of Marxism than his western colleague, and a 
less impressive knowledge of the real texts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Even if 
he is reluctant to admit it, the socialist lawyer is usually aware that a pragmatic 
and flexible approach to Marxism in the Soviet bloc has deprived the "sacred 
books" of their real substance. 
Secondly, it will amaze the western student that the socialist lawyer has only 
a slight recollection of Stuchka, Pashukanis, or Vyshinsky. The socialist lawyer 
frequently does not know too much about the tensions within the Soviet legal 
theory of the Stalin era, but is well read in the works of Ihering, Leband, 
Jellinek, Dugit, Petrazhitsky, Kelsen, Hart, and Fuller. The western student will 
find that his interlocutor feels more comfortable when discussing the history of 
natural law, positivistic jurisprudence, or U.S. functionalism than Pashukanis' 
GENKIN, RADZIECKIE PRAWO CYWILNE (SOVIET CIVIL LAW) (1955). Stepan Kechekjan is an expert on 
the sources of socialist law. His book dealing with this subject [So KECHEIqAN, PRAWO SOCjALISTYCZNE 
IJEGO ZRODLA (SOCIALIST LAW AND ITS SOURCES) (1952)] was also published in other socialist countries. 
See also A. PIGOLKIN & I. ROZHKO, SOVETSKOE ZAKONODATELSTVO I Evo ROL V KOMUNISTICHESKOM 
STROITELSTVE (SOVIET LEGISLATION AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM) (1976) 
[hereinafter PIGOLKIN & ROZHKO]; M. STROGOVITCH & S. GOLUNSKII, THEORY OF STATE AND LAW 
(1940) reprinted in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (H. Bobb trans. 1951). 
For comment on Strogovitch's theory of state and law, see KELSEN, supra note I, at 133-47; TEoRIA 
GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA (THEORY OF THE STATE AND LAW) (A. Denisov ed. 1980); K. OPALEK, PRAWO 
PODMIOTOWE. STUDjUM Z TEORII PRAWA (THE SUBJECT LAW: THE STUDY FROM THE THEORY OF LAW) 
(1957); K. OPALEK & J. WROBLEWSKI, TEORIA PANSTWA I PRAWA (THEORY OF STATE AND LAW) (1966); 
J. WROBLEWSKI, WSTEP DO PRAWOZNAWSTWA (INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE) (1957); J. WROB-
LEWSKI, KRYTYKA NORMATYWNEj TEORII PANSTWA I PRAWA HANSA KELSENA (THE CRITICISM OF HANS 
KELSEN'S NORMATIVIST THEORY OF LAW) (1957). 
5 Even the most recently published work of Alice Erh-Soon Tay and Eugene Kamenka shows the 
same characteristics. Erh-Soon Tay & Kamenka, Marxism, Socialism and the Theory of Law, 23 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1985) [hereinafter Erh-Soon Tay & Kamenka]. 
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"commodity exchange conception of law." Asked about the rationale of this 
seeming paradox, the socialist lawyer would reluctantly explain that for socialist 
theorists, it is safer to examine critically different sorts of capitalist concepts of 
law than to become involved in the analysis of Marxist theory. The latter 
undertaking can easily result in the labeling of the author's comments as revi-
sionary and the author himself as a wrecker, a nihilist, or an anti-Marxist. 
As a result of this unsuccessful inquiry, the western theorist usually comes to 
the conclusion that nothing significant has happened in socialist jurisprudence 
in the post-Pashukanis era and that the period of creative evolution of Marxist 
legal theory ended with the disappearance of Pashukanis in Stalin's purge.6 
II. CHANGES IN SOVIET JURISPRUDENCE IN THE POST-PASHUKANIS ERA 
A. General Background 
The prominence of Pashukanis' theory in the United States stands in contrast 
to the failure of its predictions. Soviet practice has shown simply that Pashukanis' 
theory was wrong. No evidence exists that the Marxist concept of the withering 
away of state and law which Pashukanis wanted to develop creatively has any 
chance for implementation in any known social system in the world. Pashukanis 
and his followers were liquidated in the typical Stalinist way. There was no 
reason to sympathize with successors whose arguments were less sophisticated 
than those of Pashukanis and Stuchka and whose calumnious language was 
unacceptable to western academic culture. The fact, however, is that the Pashu-
kanis theory was eliminated because it was utopian generally and, at that mo-
ment, completely incompatible with Stalin's policy.' This conclusion must be 
borne in mind when examining the evolution of Soviet jurisprudence from 
revolutionary nihilism to legal realism. 
Pashukanis' legal theories grew out of revolutionary naive optimism that all 
of Marx's predictions relating to the future of communist society would be 
realized quickly. During the Communist revolution and ensuing civil war many 
old Bolsheviks in Russia believed that the withering away of legal and political 
6 This opinion was clearly expressed by the western theorists. See Erh-Soon Tay & Kamenka, supra 
note 5, at 245. "[Olnly two Marxist writers on legal theory [Karl Renner and Eugene Pashukanisl have 
had any significant respect from the western theorists." See also PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, supra note 
2, at 72. 
Rudolf Schlesinger has stressed that "no elaborate theory has yet filled the gap caused by the 
dropping of the Commodity Exchange Conception of Law." R. SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY, 
ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 242-43 (1951) [hereinafter SCHLESINGERl. See also BEIRNE 
& SHARLET, supra note 2; Bierne & Sharlet, Pashukanis and Socialist Legality, in MARXISM AND LAw, supra 
note 2, at 306. As Lon Fuller wrote, "His work is in the best tradition of Marxism. It is the product 
of thorough scholarship and wide reading." See Pashukanis and Vyshinsky, supra note 2, at 1159. 
7 After Lenin's death Stalin tried to strengthen his dictatorship. The theory of the withering away 
of the state and law was contrary to the fundamental premises of his politics. 
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institutions would begin immediately after the victory of the revolution. As 
Mihaly Samu wrote, "They believed that all types and forms of the state could 
be abolished at a single stroke and forgot the Marxist reference to the need of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat during the period of transition."8 The jurists 
of the revolutionary period maintained that the new society would form a special 
communist morality and a revolutionary consciousness of justice would replace 
formal bourgeois legality and traditional codes of law. The belief that law itself 
is necessary for any society was labeled a feature of "legal fetishism" which 
Marx criticized so strongly.9 
It was Lenin who claimed that law would not wither away with the extinction 
of the bourgeois state. In his State and Revolution, Lenin argued that the bour-
geois state could be abolished only by revolution; the socialist state, in contrast, 
would wither away in a process of gradual transformation. The process of 
creating a collective, socialist mentality was not to be rapid, however, and this 
fact would necessarily slow down the process of withering away of the state. 
The state machinery of social control and law had to exist in the transition 
period. It was, however, the machinery of control over individuals, not over 
classes, which was to disappear gradually. 
According to Lenin, the process of withering away was to start in the revo-
lutionary period. During that period, a substantial part of private law was to be 
incorporated into public law. After the revolution, bourgeois law would begin 
to disappear proportionately to economic transformations. lO 
The idea that bourgeois law would partially wither away and partially operate 
under the first phase of communist societyll was considered by the Soviet jurists 
of the 1920s and the early 1930s, with Stuchka and Pashukanis leading the way. 
They emphasized that it was bourgeois law that would wither away and that it 
was not going to be replaced by a form of socialist law. Pashukanis wrote: 
The withering away of certain categories of bourgeois law (the 
categories as such, not this or that precept) in no way implies their 
replacement by new categories of proletarian law, just as the with-
ering away of the categories of value, capital, profit and so forth in 
the transformation to fully-developed socialism will not mean the 
emergence of new proletarian categories of value, capital and so 
on.12 
8 Current Problems of Socialist jurisprudence-Proceedings of the jubilee Session on the Occasion of the Lenin 
Centenary 20 (1971) [hereinafter Current Problems of Socialist jurisprudence]. 
9 See COLLINS, supra note I, at 15. 
10 See Current Problems of Socialist jurisprudence, supra note 8. For a more detailed analysis of Lenin's 
approach to the theory of the withering away of the state and law, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 
2. 
II See Lenin, State and Revolution, 7 SELECTED WORKS 89 (1932). 
12 LAW & MARXISM, supra note 2, at 61. 
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For Pashukanis, law was a bourgeois category that regulated relationships be-
tween isolated individuals in the process of commodity exchange. Lenin antic-
ipated that law was to start to wither away with the introduction of communist 
economic relationships and the liquidation of the private sphere of exchange. 
In the New Economic Policy (NEP) period, the "commodity exchange school 
of law" gained ascendency and its influence on the Marxist theory of law 
increased. The preservation of a capitalist market apparently justified the con-
tinu~d existence of strong state authority and extended legal relationships. Yet, 
eithrr the retreat from the NEP and the introduction of more advanced com-
munist transformations had to be accompanied by a visible reduction of the 
function of law, or Pashukanis' orthodox Marxist notion of law was incompatible 
with revolutionary practice. 
The result of this dilemma could be anticipated by careful study of Stalin's 
policy. Both Stuchka and Pashukanis began to be criticized as reductionists for 
their tendency to identify all law with bourgeois law, and legal relationships 
solely with economic phenomena. 13 In early 1937, Pashukanis was denounced 
as a "traitor and wrecker" and soon afterwards he disappeared, probably liq-
uidated at Stalin's order.14 
While Pashukanis' attempt to interpret Marxism was rooted in an assumption 
that the realities of life in the young Soviet state would follow the predictions 
of the fathers of scientific communism, the Stalinist theorists faced the necessity 
of adopting Marxism to the changing conditions of socialist life. They learned 
that Lenin's generation of revolutionaries knew how to subvert, destroy, and 
change, but had little knowledge of how to build or create, or introduce more 
advanced institutions, better economic techniques, or improved agricultural 
methods. Lenin's generation of revolutionaries did not know how to adopt the 
Marxist concept of state and law to a new reality. For them, Marxism served as 
a sacred guide to be followed almost blindly. 
Pashukanis' successors discovered that experience is usually a better teacher 
than theory. The tenets of genuine Marxism often proved inapplicable in post-
revolutionary Russia. Soon it appeared that the new state, despite the party 
adherence to Marxism, did not practice its basic assumptions. "Conventional 
hypocrisy," using Lenin's term, had yet to affect also the sphere of law. The 
Stalinist legal theorist solved the dilemma of the gap between theory and practice 
by appearing to adhere to the basic dogmas of Marxism, while imposing strictly 
controlled thought. The greater their pragmatic deviations, the more they 
pretended to be strict orthodox followers of scientific communism. To complain 
that they were less Marxian and that after Pashukanis and Renner creative 
13 See VYSHINSKY, supra note 2, at 50-54. The reader should compare this view with that offered by 
Kelsen. See KELSEN, supra note 1, at 62. 
14 See Erh-Soon Tay & Kamenka, supra note 5, at 249. 
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interpretation of Marxism in the Soviet Union ceased would be the equivalent 
of complaining that the totalitarian transformation of postrevolutionary Russia 
did not adhere to the concept of Marx's democratic socialism. Both are "a 
matter of course" statements. Being a Marxist, Pashukanis did not fit to Stalin's 
system because this system was Marxism in name only. In the Soviet reality, 
Pashukanis was more Marxian but also more utopian. Stalinist and post-Stalinist 
theorists were more typical of totalitarian science and further away from "gen-
uine Marxism," but their "conventional hypocrisy" and cynicism were more 
practical than utopian. While these theorists were less "creative" theoretically, 
they were instructive regarding the nature of the Soviet system. 
This is not to say that the legal theory of the post-Pashukanis era is not worthy 
of more detailed study. To interpret socialist jurisprudence correctly, however, 
one must examine it against the background of political and social life in the 
Soviet bloc rather than against Marx's theory of law. If we want to study current 
socialist theory we must change the focus of our inquiry. From a sociopolitical 
point of view, it makes sense to study a number of successive maneuvers under-
taken by the socialist theorists in order to expose the "decorative" character of 
their theory. 
This author will examine the social and political role of socialist theory of 
law, and will attempt to explain why, despite its "decorative" character, the 
concept of the withering away of state and law was not abandoned by socialist 
jurisprudence in the post-Pashukanis era. 
B. Legal Normativism 
The critics of Pashukanis' "commodity exchange theory," led by Andrei Vy-
shinsky, made several points important for the further development of Soviet 
jurisprudence. They stressed the existence of socialist law and opposed the idea 
that it is solely an institution adopted from the capitalist system. The thesis that 
socialism created a new, higher form of the legal superstructure was emphasized 
by Vyshinsky and, until recently, it was never challenged in the Soviet theory 
of law. In currently published textbooks of socialist jurisprudence, authors still 
emphasize that "it is the socialist state and law which replaced the bourgeois 
state and law and which is going to wither away."15 
The Stalinist theorists also broke with the traditions of Soviet legal realism 
and adopted the normativist concept of law introduced into Soviet jurisprudence 
by Kozlowski in 1919. 16 His definition of law as "an aggregate of norms" was 
15See TEORIA GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA (THEORY OF STATE AND LAW) 422 (A. Denisov ed. 1970) 
[hereinafter THEORY OF STATE AND LAW]. See also THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 213 (V. Chkhikvadze 
ed. 1969) [hereinafter SOVIET STATE AND LAW]; PIGOLKIN & ROZHKO, supra note 4, at 12. 
16 18 ZVEZDA (1919). See also A. Plotnieks, 0 Ponimanii Sovetskovo Prava--Prodolzenie, 8 SOVETSKOE 
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 56-57 (1979). 
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discussed and partially adopted by Krylenko, and extended by Vyshinsky, who 
maintained: 
[L]aw is the totality of the rules of conduct, expressing the will of 
the dominant class and established in legal order, and of customs 
and rules of community life sanctioned by state authority-their 
application being guaranteed by the compulsive force of the state 
in order to guard, secure, and develop social relations and social 
orders advantageous and agreeable to the dominant class.17 
Legal normativism had strong advocates throughout the entire Stalinist era. 
During World War II, this trend found firm support in the popular work Theory 
of State and Law by Golunskii and Strogovitch. 18 Even today, despite growing 
criticism, legal normativism has its respected advocates. In 1979 the discussion 
on the notion of law in Sovietskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo (Soviet State and Law), 
Golunskii's and Strogovitch's definition of law was repeated by Akcenenok. The 
normativist trend also found strong backing from the group of theorists led by 
Bratus, the veteran of the Stalinist attacks on Pashukanis' "commodity exchange" 
school. Bratus claimed, "To understand what law means-it is enough to char-
acterize it as a system of norms, which is protected in the case of violation by 
governmental state coercion."19 
C. The "Dialectic" Approach to the Future of the Socialist State and Law 
The most significant innovation introduced into the field of Soviet jurispru-
dence by the Stalinist school of law was the so-called "dialectic" understanding 
of the process of withering away of state and law. Stalin explained the concept 
in his report to the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union: 
We are for the withering away of the state. And we are for strength-
ening the dictatorship of proletariat, the strongest and mightiest 
power of all which existed until today. The highest development of 
the power of the state to prepare the conditions for the withering 
away of the state power-it is the Marxist expression. That is con-
tradictory. Yes, it is. But this contradiction is a real contradiction 
which is compatible with the Marxist dialectic. 20 
I7 VYSHINSKY, supra note 2, at 50. See also I. Samoshchenko, a Ponimanii Sovetskovo Prava, 7 Sov-
ETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 61 (1979). 
18 S.A. Golunskii & M.S. Strogovich, Theory of State and Law, Institute of Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy 
of Sciences (1940). 
19 G.A. Akcenenok, a Ponimanii Sovetskovo Prava, 7 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 65 (1979). See 
also the more moderate opinion of A.F. Cherdancev, who stressed a "complex" character of law, 
putting some emphasis on its normativist component, however. [d. at 67-70. 
20 Quoted from the Polish edition of J. STALIN, Report from June 27, 1930, 7 SELECTED WORKS 367 
(1930). 
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The dialectic character of the process of the withering away was to lie in the 
fact that, without a strong state and law, the phase of mature communism could 
not be reached and, without mature Communist society, the state and law could 
not wither away.21 
Stalin's theory, developed by Vyshinsky's school, helped Soviet jurists escape 
the traps of the idea of "bourgeois law without bourgeoisie," which was hardly 
acceptable in the post-NEP period. While it was extremely inconvenient to 
maintain that the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat still used bourgeois 
law, it was obvious that the state and law were not going to wither away. To 
solve this dilemma, Soviet jurists had to adopt the category of "socialist law;" 
the process of the extinction of the state and law had to be put off into the 
remote future. 
The concept of the withering away as a lengthy process gained acceptance 
and became a firm component of socialist jurisprudence. In the post-Stalinist 
era the idea was expressed in a collective work edited by Chkikvadze: "Marxism 
regards the withering away of the state as a long process in which the socialist 
state system develops and grows into communist public self-administration, a 
process covering a whole historical epoch when the necessary conditions for the 
withering away of the state are created."22 This thesis had been analyzed re-
peatedly in numerous publications which emphasized that "for full extinction 
of the state it is necessary to fulfill some internal and some external conditions. "23 
The internal conditions are usually reduced to the well-known decalogue 
which explains that the process of the withering away of the state and law will 
be completed when 
1. The development of the economy and culture will enable the implemen-
tation of the basic Communist principle: "From each in accordance with his 
capabilities and to each in accordance with his needs." 
2. The property of the cooperatives and other social institutions will be 
incorporated into one common Communist ownership. 
3. The differences between cities and villages will disappear. 
4. The differences between the approach to mental and manual work will 
disappear. 
21 See generally THEORY OF STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, at 411. 
22 SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, at 87. See also THEORY OF STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, 
at 410; H. Szebanow, Problemy demokracji i Praworzadnosci po XXIV Zjezdzie KPZR (Problems of Democracy 
and Legality after the XXIXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), 7 PANSTWO I PRAWO 12 
(1971). The reader should compare this view with the address of J. Kadar, International Meeting of the 
Communist and Proletarian Parties 464 (1969). The postponement of the withering away of the state and 
law was criticized in the Yugoslavian Program of the Communist Union. See the Polish text examined 
in WSPOLCZESNY ANTYKOMUNIZM A NAUKI SPOLECZNE (CURRENT ANTI-COMMUNISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE) 
39 (1970). 
23 Materials of XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, cited in THEORY OF STATE AND 
LAW, supra note 15, at 410. 
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5. Nationalist feeling will disappear. 
6. The working day will be shorter. 
7. The culture of all working people will grow. 
8. Crimes and other violations of the social order will no longer exist. 
9. Democracy will be fully developed and all people will instinctively partici-
pate in solving the common problems. 
10. The communist morality will be strengthened. 
"The full implementation of all these conditions, to say nothing of external 
circumstances, will signify the end of the process of the withering away."24 In 
addition, the total withering away of the state and law requires proper external 
conditions and, in particular, the consolidation of socialism on a world scale.25 
D. The Paradox of the Class Law in the Classless Society 
The Stalinist concept of socialist law as an institution that would wither away 
as the result of a lengthy process of building the internal and external prereq-
uisites of mature Communism had to overcome one important theoretical ob-
stacle. Marxism insisted that the state and law have a class character because 
they are instruments of class rule and, therefore, when classes disappear so will 
they. In Origins of Family, Private Property and the State, Engels wrote that "classes 
will inevitably disappear in the same way as they came into existence in the past. 
Along with the extinction of classes will inevitably disappear the state."26 
The Stalinist theory of law, however, had to recognize that law retained its 
class character during the dictatorship of the proletariat. IIi his broadly quoted 
article on the definition of law, Stalgevitch wrote, "Law as well as [the] state is 
a phenomeIion typical of class society, a product and manifestation of the 
irreconcilability of class contradictions. It has a class character and serves as one 
of the instruments of the implementation of the purposes of the ruling dass."27 
In contrast, however, Stalin proclaimed that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
abolished classes. The socialist theory of law found itself in a trap. Class law 
without classes was a self-contradictory concept. If law was nothing but an 
instrument of class domination, it could exist only in a society split into opposite 
classes. As Hugh Collins wrote, "The whole thesis of the withering away of law 
rests upon the dubious definitional fiat that rules which serve any other purpose 
than class oppression cannot be law."28 
24 Socjalisticheskoe Gosadarstvo (1972); Yuridicheskaia Literatura I used the Polish edition, Teoria 
Panstwa Socjalistyczanego 494 (1976) [hereinafter Teoria Panstwa Socjalistyczanego]. 
25 See VYSHINSKY, supra note 2, at 61; See also SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, at 87, 88. 
26 MARX & ENGELS, 20 SOCHINENIA (WORKS) 173. 
27 Stalgevitch, K Voprosu Poniatii Prava (The Question of Definition of Law) 7 SOVETSKOE GOSVDARSTVO 
I PRAVO 50 (1948) [hereinafter Stalgevitch]. 
28 COLLINS, supra note I, at 106. 
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This contradiction led the Stalinist theorists to the theoretical acrobatics that 
resulted in the concept of class but nonantagonistic structure of the socialist 
society. Theorists contended that the state and law would wither away along 
with the disappearance of classes, but these processes would not be concurrent. 
As usual, this phenomenon should be understood in the dialectic way. This 
time, the dialectic approach meant that the abolition of classes proclaimed by 
Stalin did not result in the simultaneous creation of a classless society. It meant 
only that the exploiter bourgeoisie was destroyed. The Stalinist Constitution 
declared that "antagonistic classes have ceased to exist in our society-only 
classes friendly to each other have remained and are in authority-the working 
class which makes real its guidance of society and the peasantry."29 
This solution was also hardly compatible with orthodox Marxism. Marx's 
original definition of class lay in the concept of a society divided into two 
antagonistic social groups, exploiters and the exploited, the members of which 
shared the same economic and social status. A conflict theory of society made 
sense in a society divided into classes, but became meaningless when classes 
were no longer antagonistic. To Stalinist jurists, "class" was synonymous with 
"social group." This classic Marxist category was maintained only to hide the 
self-contradictory concept of class law in a classless society. 
For Soviet theorists, this device made the contradiction less visible, helped to 
avoid inconvenient conclusions, and gave the concept of law in the phase of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat at least the color of reason. Students of the Marxist 
theory of law were persuaded that socialist law retained its class character simply 
because the nonantagonistic society was not yet classless, and would not become 
classless until it was transformed into the society of the entire people. In the 
era of Stalinist terror, nobody wanted to examine the coherence of these dan-
gerous issues more profoundly. 
E. The Law in the" State of All People" 
In the late 1950s, the problem of the class character of law began to haunt 
the Soviet theorists again.so Soviet jurisprudence proclaimed that the Soviet 
Union was entering the phase of mature socialism in which classes disappeared 
forever, and even the remnants of the bourgeoisie were destroyed. Society 
became "the union of all the toilers" and "the organization of all the people." 
The classless society was strengthened as a result of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. but society did not need that dictatorship any more. Finally. the 
Constitution of 1977 confirmed the thesis that the Soviet state passed the stage 
29 See VYSHINSKY, supra note 2, at 123. 
'0 Compare this view with PIGOLKIN & ROZHKO, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
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of dictatorship of the proletariat and entered a new phase of the mature, 
classless society. 
In this period, Soviet authors continued to maintain that law in the society of 
all the people, despite the fact that it does not represent one class but all classes, 
still has a class character.3 ! Chkikvadze wrote: 
This new stage [of the society of all the people] is marked, firstly, 
by the fact that the law is an expression of all classes and social 
sections of society, without exceptions, in the form of the state, and 
is a reflection of all their essential interests. There is no class or 
social section in the Soviet Union which is antagonistic in respect of 
the law or vice versa.32 
As Hans Kelsen argued convincingly, the concept of class society, class law, and 
class state became meaningless simply because the dominant class of toilers was 
identified with the entire society.33 
The failure to adjust the Marxist theory of law to the concept of a classless 
society led Soviet theorists to employ a very characteristic maneuver. In current 
publications, the definition of law and its class character, and the thesis of the 
withering away of law are always discussed separately.34 While this strategy 
cannot avoid the vicious circle of Soviet jurisprudence, it apparently protects 
the Soviet theorists against the exposition of embarrassing conclusions. 
F. Overgrowth of the State and Law into Socialist Self-Government 
In the post-Stalinist era, socialist jurists critically examined the dialectic con-
cept of the withering away through consolidation and strengthening of society. 
In the satellite socialist countries and in Yugoslavia, the moderate opponents of 
the Stalinist dialectic argued that this concept contributed to dogmatization of 
Marxism-Leninism and as a result, limited the progress of social and economic 
relationships in the socialist countries.35 
31 A. Galin & M. Farushkin, Protiv Antimarksistovskich Postrojenij Burzuazyjnych Tieoretikov Gosudarstva 
i Prava (Against Anti·Marxist Conceptions of the Bourgeois Theorists of the State and Law) 2 SOVETSKOE 
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 56 (1968). 
"SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, at 218. 
33 KELSEN, supra note 4, at 139-40. 
34 A discussion on the notions of law in 7-8 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (1979) provides the 
best example. A number of respected theorists discussed the definition of law in these volumes, but 
they never touched upon the problem of the withering away of law. 
35 See Program Zwiazku Komunistow Jugoslawii. Krytyka Komunista (Program of the Communist Union of 
Yugoslavia. The Criticism of 'Communist') 51-55 (1969). See also J. SMIALOWSKI, ZAGADNIENIE PRZYSZLOSCI 
PANSTWA W MYSLI SOCjALISTYCZNEJ (THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE OF THE STATE IN THE HISTORY OF 
SOCIALIST THOUGHT) 195-209 (1978) [hereinafter SMIALOwSKlj. 
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Some of the Soviet theorists tried to substitute for the dialectic concept the 
idea of "the overgrowth of the state into socialist self-government."36 They 
agreed that the withering away of the state and law will take a long time, that 
the process is gradual, and that it has already begun. Soviet theories asserted 
that it is not necessary to wait for mature communism to perceive its effects.37 
These theorists explained that in the society of the entire people the state and 
law are not exclusively coercive instruments. Law also regulates social relations 
and educates. The state runs interests of all the people and in this sense it is 
only a "half-state."38 As Chkikvadze wrote: 
Soviet theory has recognized that Andrei Vyshinsky's interpretation 
of socialist law was erroneous because it emphasized solely coercive 
aspects of law. It tended to minimize the important ideological, 
educational and organisational role of Soviet law. It was a wrong 
view under the dictatorship of proletariat to say nothing of the law 
of the whole people.39 
The gradual process of the overgrowth of the state into socialist self-govern-
ment is characterized by (1) the tendency to reduce the role of coercion in social 
relationships; (2) the tendency to increase the participation of all people in the 
running of the state; (3) the tendency to transfer many important state functions 
to social organizations; and (4) the tendency of the state to gradually drop its 
political character.4o In the overgrowth process the state and society will blend 
into an integrated whole. Socialist state development is the process of the 
gradual integration of the state and society, in which the former is incorporated 
by the latter. Communist self-government will be reached when the process 
ends with full union.4l 
The careful observer of this trend may, however, discover with surprise that 
the extinction of the state may also be understood in the peculiar dialectic way. 
It does not matter whether the self-governmental organs ultimately replace the 
state institutions or vice versa. As Kowalski tried to argue, "In these conditions 
[of mature communism], contrasting state form with the self-governmental form 
ceases to make sense. The state forms become simply the highest form of self-
36 Smialowski maintains that there is a trend in Soviet jurisprudence that tries to combine both the 
dialectic theory and the concept of overgrowth of state into self-government. See SMIALOWSKI, supra 
note 35, at 266-87. 
37 See R. Kudriacew, Przeciw Upraszczaniu i Wulgaryzacji, 10 ZESZYTY TEORETYCZNO-POLITYCZNE (1959) 
(originally published in 14 KOMUNIST (1959)). 
38 SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 243. 
39 SOVIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 14, at 218. 
40 S. ZAWADZKI, FILOZOFIA MARKSISTOWSKA 440-44 (1970). See also THEORY OF STATE AND LAW, supra 
note 15, at 485, 488. 
41 THEORY OF STATE AND LAW, supra note 15, at 505. 
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government."42 It is quite obvious that identification of the self-government and 
the state institutions would justify the existence of vast legal and governmental 
organs even in the phase of mature communism, but it would also make the 
whole Marxist concept of the withering away of the law and state meaningless. 
G. The "Pluralistic" Definition of Law 
In the late 1970s, legal normativism, a dominant trend in the socialist theory 
of law since 1938, declined. In the definition of law initiated by the Sovietskoe 
Gosudarstvo i Pravo (Soviet State and Law), the normativist trend was challenged 
for its dogmatism and idealism.43 The respected Soviet theorist Tumanov ar-
gued that the abuses of normativism produce a tendency to educe principles of 
law from norms when it should be the reverse. 44 Akcenenok argued that the 
normative theory "does not throw light on the social and economic conditionality 
of law."45 Other disputants maintained that normativism separates abstract 
norms from life and does not reflect real social relations. 
Commentators observing the dispute admit that the theorists' attempts to 
create a concept which could substitute for the normativist theory were not very 
successful. The return to the legal realism of Stuchka and Pashukanis and the 
attempt to revise Marxism were too dangerous. As usual, recourse to eclecticism 
seemed to be the most secure tactic. The participants of the dispute who were 
critical of pure normativism tried to work out a pluralistic concept of law which 
could combine psychological, normative, and sociological components. As Do-
brjazko maintained, "Ignorance of any of these components might result in a 
defective perception of law."46 
Traditional psychological theory assumes that law is a collection of certain 
normative ideas forming a psychological reality. The proponents of the plur-
alistic theory emphasize that law expresses the will of the dominant class which 
does not mean simply the sum of wills of individuals who compose this class.47 
The will manifests itself in the legal consciousness of the class or nation. This 
consciousness reflects current social relations rooted in the material conditions 
of life. In turn, the legal consciousness expresses itself in the legal ideas of the 
society. The will of the dominant class manifested in the legal consciousness 
and in the legal ideas of society is comprehended as the psychological compo-
42 S. Kowalski, Zasady Funkcjonowunia Socjalistycznego Systemu, 3 STUDIA NAUK POLITYCZNYCH 57-58, 
60 (1972) (quoted from SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 276). 
43 A. Mickievitch, Krugwy Stol Sovetskovo Gosudarstva i Prava--O Ponimanii Sovetskovo Prava, 7 SOY' 
ETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 58 (1979) [hereinafter Mickievitch]. 
44/d. 
45/d. at 65. 
46 [d. at 66. 
47 Compare this view with Stalgevitch, supra note 27, at 52. 
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nent of law. The state expresses class consciousness in norms sanctioned by state 
organs.48 Through norms the state regulates social relations and affects the legal 
consciousness of the society.49 Livshic concluded that "law is composed of legal 
consciousness, norms and social relations."5o 
The pluralistic definition proposed by one commentator, Ushakov, reads as 
follows: 
Law is a form of social consciousness which manifests itself as the 
national measure of people's conduct in the society organized by 
the state; this consciousness expresses itself as the system of rules 
of conduct which represents a will of a class or the whole nation. 
This will is elevated by the state in the form of statutes and other 
sources of law to the rank of the binding commands which in 
themselves serve as a unit measurement of the conduct of the peo-
ple.51 
A group of more cautious commentators tried to stress that the normative 
component is the most important element of law. Others tried to distinguish 
law from legal superstructure, the latter being a broader category which em-
braces law, legal consciousness and legal relationships. Law according to this 
proposal would still be understood as an aggregate of norms. 52 
Generally, the tensions in Soviet jurisprudence during the late 1970s did not 
introduce any revolutionary changes into the concept of socialist law, but, rather, 
rejuvenated the dispute over the definition of law. During this time, younger 
socialist theorists became aware of the problems which rankled Soviet jurists 
since the Stalinist period and which were not discussed in the late 1950s and 
1960s. 
H. The Socialist State Will Not Wither Away 
Alice Erh-Soon Tay and Eugene Komenka have written: "The classical Marx-
ist belief that state and law will wither away once class rule has been overcome 
is dead."53 Socialist countries still have vast legal systems which do not show 
signs of withering away. Yet Soviet theorists still adhere to the thesis that state 
and law will wither away once class rule is overcome; they only concede that it 
will not happen immediately. Recently, the future of the socialist state and law 
48 Compare this view with P. Livshic, 0 Ponimanii Sovetskovo Prava-Prodolzenie, 8 SOVETSKOE Gosu-
DARSTVO I PRAVO 59 (1979) [hereinafter LivshicJ. 
49Id. at 60. 
50Id. Some disputants strongly opposed the proposal of including legal relationships in the substance 
of law. See PIGOLKIN & ROZHKO, supra note 4, at 65. 
51 Livshic, supra note 48, at 62. 
52 Mickievitch, supra note 43, at 52, 55. 
53 See Erh-Soon Tay & Kamenka, supra note 5, at 217. 
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stimulated great interest, but the concept of withering away was not officially 
denied or openly criticized in the Soviet Union. One can, however, note some 
indications of the more critical approach to the concept in Poland where the 
political turbulence of the late 1970s and early 1980s favored more open aca-
demic discussion. 
In 1978, the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland published Jerzy Smi-
alowski's dissertation on The Future of the Socialist State in the History of Socialist 
Thought. 54 The author openly and courageously attacked socialist jurisprudence 
for its dogmatism. Reviewing the current trends in the socialist theory of law, 
he wrote: "These theorists are wrong in that they take Marxism primarily as a 
collection of binding dogmas and disregard the historical and social context."55 
Smialowski distinguished a few trends in the Polish theory of law. He criticized 
the revisionists led by Adam Schaff, to suggest that the classics of Marxism did 
not take the concept of the withering away very seriously. 56 Smialowski dismissed 
the arguments of Ladosz and Orzechowski, who recently tried seriously to 
defend the concept of the withering away of the state and law. 57 In his opinion, 
the trend of Stalinist jurisprudence, which intended to postpone the process of 
the withering away until the indefinite victory of communism, was a relatively 
strong signal that the socialist jurists are aware of the theory's decline.58 Indeed, 
Smialowski stressed that many socialist theorists admit cautiously that the con-
cept of the future of the socialist state and law does not exist in socialist legal 
thought.59 He concluded: 
[T]he process of the withering away of the state was not taking place 
and is not perceptible in any of the socialist countries despite their 
over half-century experience. It proves that this process is by no 
means an objective tendency which could be derived as a social 
regularity from the historical development of the human civilization 
and cannot be considered as such. What matters is the fact that we 
can not treat the theory of the withering away of the state and law 
as an inviolable rule of the development of socialist societies.60 
Smialowski's approach to the Marxist theory of the future of the state and 
law was not well received. Smialowski's dissertation was to qualify him to be a 
54 See supra note 35. 
55 SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 168. 
56 A. SCHAFF, MARKSIZM AJEDNOSTKA LUDZKA (MARXISM AND THE HUMAN BEING) 194-95 (1965). See 
also SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 252. 
57 SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 235. 
58 Id. at 136. 
59 J. WIATR, SPOTECZENSWO. STEP DO SOCjOLOGII SYSTEMATYCZNEJ (SOCIETY. INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SYSTEM OF SOCIOLOGY) 400 (1964). See also R. Buchala, Panstwo---Zlo Konieezne ezy Dohro Wspolne? (The 
State-Necessary Evil or Common Value?), 9 WIEZ 52 (1969). 
60 SMIALOWSKI, supra note 35, at 281-82. 
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professor of the theory of state and law at the Institute of Political Science at 
the Jagiellonian University. Several copies of the dissertation were published 
for internal use by the law schools but his thesis was turned down as a basis for 
professorship by the Main Qualifying Committee which operates at the Polish 
Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Technics, and confirms all academic 
degrees. 
It is not surprising that Smialowski's thesis did not find broad support in 
socialist jurisprudence. Indeed, it is puzzling that, despite the controversial 
nature of his work, it was still published. The fact that it was published hints at 
the academic centers' approach to the Marxist concept of the future of the 
socialist state and law. As Smialowski commented: 
It is worthy of attention that the above-mentioned thesis, referring 
to the socialist state, ... did not meet with any reaction in the 
academic circle, either on the ground of theory or practice. It un-
doubtedly signifies what was the impact of dogmatism at this time. 
If, namely, we could assume that my opinions were wrong, then 
they should have been criticized. If they were right, they should 
have been developed. Yet, the silence of the academic circles in the 
matter so important for the political organization of the socialist 
society as the role of the socialist state and law can be explained, 
but in some extent only, by the negative influence of the dogmatic 
political and social practice. The indifferent approach of most theor-
ists in Poland and the other socialist countries to the significant 
scientific truth proves that this truth was reached not through the 
analysis of the political and social realities of our state, based even 
on the simplest everyday observation, but through the adoption as 
true of some academic structures which were formed on the basis 
of the ideas proclaimed in the XIXth century and which are not 
adequate to the current circumstances.61 
III. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MARXIST THEORY 
The decay of Communist ideology and its legal components is a theme in all 
debates regarding the future of the socialist system. Numerous commentators 
on Soviet domestic problems emphasize the decomposition of Marxism-Lenin-
ism in the Soviet bloc. They argue that in today's Soviet bloc countries, nobody 
takes ideological cliches seriously. Party leaders are cynical, the public is disap-
pointed with communism, and lawyers do not see any sign that law and state 
are going to wither away in the Soviet system. As Vladimir Bukovsky has written: 
"From top to bottom, no one believes in Marxist dogma anymore, even though 
61Id. at 201-02. 
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they continue to measure their actions by it, refer to it, and use it as a stick to 
beat one another with: it is a proof of loyalty and a meal ticket."62 
Distinguished writers such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn assert that Marxism-
Leninism is a dead ideology in that even at its inception it was mistaken in its 
predictions, and in that it was never a science. Soviet leaders blindly follow this 
false and harmful ideology. The leaders' adherence to the precepts of Marxism-
Leninism results in costly economic and social failures. "The spiritual renais-
sance of our country," argues Solzhenitsyn, "lies in our liberation from this 
deadening, killing ideology."63 Why do the Soviet leaders not follow Solzhenit-
syn's advice and why do they try not to abandon the obsolete theory? Are there 
any chances for further creative development of the Marxist jurisprudence? 
Does ideology still cause Soviet leaders to act? The answers to these questions 
are not clear. 
The author of this Article has discussed numerous trends in the field of 
socialist jurisprudence: postrevolutionary nihilism, legal realism of the NEP 
period, legal normativism, the pluralistic and eclectic trend, the dialectic ap-
proach to the future of the socialist state and law, and finally, the concept of 
the overgrowth of the state and its legal institutions into the socialist self-
government. None of these trends has had a significant impact upon the theory 
of law; none of these trends has solved any of the important problems of world 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, there are no signs that Marxist doctrine will be 
developed creatively in the future. This does not mean, however, that the role 
played by the socialist ideology and theory of law is meaningless. Long ago 
Marxism-Leninism stopped being a guide to action, but it did not disappear. 
Though pragmatic Soviet leaders do not follow Marx's recommendations lit-
erally, communist rulers use Marxist rhetoric in their decisions, speeches, and 
works. Everyday contact with Marxist cliches and slogans has an inevitable 
impact. Adherence to Marxism-Leninism can be a source of difficulty, but it 
can also be very convenient. When unable to solve a policy question, party 
leaders can open the sacred books and find a phrase which may justify any 
decision. Obviously a mechanical application of Marxism may only exacerbate 
the consequences of an inept policy, but the ideological facade is a useful 
weapon. Viewed from the perspective of Soviet leaders, Marxism-Leninism still 
provides a stable theoretical background for the system. 
Ideology has also played an important social role. Its unifying function has 
often been discussed by western political thinkers.64 Ideology helped the ruling 
62 Quoted in D. BARRY &: C. BARRY, CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 37 (1982). 
63 A. SOLZHENITSYN, WARNING TO THE WEST 114 (1976). 
64 The reader should compare the views found in J. BOCHENSKI &: D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 
IN THE SOVIET UNION, MARXIST IDEOLOGY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD--ITS APPEALS AND PARA-
DOXES, 60-120 (M. Drachkovitch ed. 1966). 
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elite to maximize its control over individuals' thoughts and actions. It was a 
priceless method to mobilize public energy, an excellent instrument of political 
manipulation, and an important means of shaping political culture. Indoctri-
nation was an effective form of political socialization which involved individuals 
in the political system. 
Ideological manipulation, once its efficacy was discovered, was continually 
exploited by Soviet leaders. State-controlled press, literature, and broadcasting 
were transformed into one big machinery. All groups in society received political 
education. Special political schools, universities of Marxism-Leninism, army 
study circles, and special committees of political enlightenment in factories 
created a new Communist individual subservient to the party.65 
Yet despite all these precautions, the public's common sense has not been 
destroyed by party indoctrination. Some people began to accept ideology with-
out question because the repetition of the same ideological lessons stripped 
them of critical thought.66 Others, however, ceased to react at all to ideological 
stimuli. The effectiveness of ideological manipulation has weakened consider-
ably in the last forty years. Repeated Soviet "counterrevolutions" and "periods 
of deviations" and successive disclosures of the regime'S fallacies gradually 
destroyed the magic of Marxism-Leninism. 
This growing ideological crisis was felt most strongly in the middle ranks of 
society in the Soviet bloc countries. The top party layers still take advantage of 
ideological manipulation, and it would be naive to believe they would give it up 
so easily. On the other hand, the relatively small group of dissenters at the 
bottom of the social structure never believed in Marxism-Leninism. They always 
pointed to the glaring defects of communism and tried to show how it was 
refuted by the growing body of scientific knowledge. 
The most important sign of ideological crisis came, therefore, when Marxism-
Leninism began to lose its influence on the middle ranks of society. This center 
of any Communist society consists of three important groups. The first group 
contains those who have participated in internal emigration and includes those 
who are almost totally indifferent to political issues, neither believing in ideo-
logical cliches nor willing to fight against them. The second group of passive 
observers brings together skeptics and opportunists who do not refuse partici-
pation in the regime but try to minimize it. Though not believing in the Com-
munist ideology, they pay lip service to those ideological cliches which are most 
profitable to them. The third group is most important to the Communist leaders 
and consists of the active participants who believe in the regime's ideological 
goals and are wholeheartedly engaged in creating a Soviet World Republic. This 
65 See R. CONQUEST, POLITICS OF IDEAS IN THE USSR 97-117 (1967). 
66 The reader should compare the examination of Zinoviev's points on this matter found in T. 
KOLAKOWSKI, EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: YESTERDAy-ToDAy-ToMMORROW 44 (1982). 
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group provides the party with members who are ready to make party careers 
and fight for the future of communism. The continuous dwindling of this 
group, which in some of the Communist-ruled countries has almost ceased to 
exist, is the most spectacular effect of the crisis of Communist ideology. 
If the essence of the ideological crisis is the gradual shrinking of true believers 
in Marxism-Leninism, the question is whether it makes any sense to continue 
to protect ideology if almost nobody believes in its historical mission. The answer 
of the Soviet ruling elite is a definite yes. Marxism-Leninism is still highly 
significant for the Soviet rulers. It has ceased to be the basis for their political 
judgments, but it still provides an effective means of control, of imposing 
uniformity on society. It still allows the ruling elite to stigmatize anyone it dislikes 
as an enemy of the people without an official trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Soviet leaders will not follow Solzhenitsyn's advice to 
abandon Marxism-Leninism. They will not give up an instrument that continues 
to be useful for political control. It is not ideology which binds their hands; it 
is the system of totalitarianism which has created the "vicious circle" of the 
Soviet regime. 
The window dressing character of Marxism-Leninism has had important 
social, mora\, and economic repercussions. Under pressure from the regime, 
the public had to observe ideological tenets and legal norms but could not be 
forced to respect them. The fact that ideological criteria lost credibility as the 
standard of social behavior inevitably led to the creation of a double standard 
of public morality. It left its mark on the socialist legal culture. 
For a while, ideology served to slow the process of moral corruption in socialist 
societies. The blind belief in Marxist-Leninist dogmas prevented the Soviet 
people from thinking independently. As ideological values began to lose au-
thority, there was a drastic decline in public morality and in respect for law. 
Ideological decay corrupted a generation of party members. They came to 
understand that coercion is useful not to protect ideological values but to protect 
their own privileges. The devaluation of ideology has had an equally demoral-
izing effect on the rest of society. Workers began to realize that a double 
standard of morality means one morality for the party elite and another for 
nonparty people and ordinary party members. This realization became a major 
detriment to the system of public property, the central characteristic of com-
munism. The ordinary citizen argues that, if the state doctrine is only a facade, 
then public property, sanctified by the ideology, belongs to no one. Hence the 
seizure of public property (in fact, no one's property) has nothing to do with 
theft. It is prohibited by law but not stamped by public morality. To be more 
precise, there are two public moralities, one official and the other private. 
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The collapse of public morality contributed explicitly to significant problems 
in the Soviet economy: low labor discipline, neglect of equipment, absenteeism, 
bribery, unproductive work, lack of interest in quality output, to name only a 
few, The society created unofficial techniques of social compensation, methods 
of competition for benefits available only in backstage struggles, and means of 
circumventing the pretended social equality. The system created not only a 
black market and corruption, but also unofficial channels through which many 
decisions are made and the law is avoided. A "double morality," in fact, is linked 
with the "double life" of the whole society. 
The social and political role played by ideology and its legal components still 
deserves attention. The fact that Marxism-Leninism is dead in the sense that it 
ceases to serve as a guide for either the leaders or the public does not mean 
that the ideology has no function. It still helps the ruling elite to maximize its 
control over individuals' thoughts and actions. It is still an instrument of political 
manipulation, less effective, but specifically applied. It is an important means 
of shaping the political and legal culture of society. Viewed from the perspective 
of the Soviet leader, ideology can serve as a means of legitimization or delegit-
imization of political, economic, and social decisions. Soviet leaders also consider 
ideology an excellent weapon in political struggles, and a justification of any 
international or domestic strategy. Viewed from the perspective of the western 
commentator, socialist ideology, including legal theory, is worthy of considera-
tion because of the important social, moral, and economic repercussions of its 
window-dressing character, the phenomena scarcely perceived or purposely 
ignored by the socialist theorists. If we wish to have a more complete knowledge 
of the socialist legal system, we must also study the socialist legal theory from 
this point of view. 
